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Abstract We study assignment games with externalities. The value that a firm and a
worker create depends on the matching of the other firms and workers. We ask how
the classical results on assignment games are affected by the presence of externalities.
The answer is that they change dramatically. Though stable outcomes exist if agents
are “pessimistic”, this is a knife-edge result: we show that there are problems in which
the slightest optimism by a single pair erases all stable outcomes. If agents are suffi-
ciently optimistic, then there need not exist stable outcomes even if externalities are
vanishingly small. The negative result persists also when we impose a very restrictive
structure on the values and the externalities. Furthermore, stability and efficiency no
longer go hand in hand and the set of stable outcomes need not form a lattice with
respect to the agents’ payoffs.
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1 Introduction
We examine the impact that externalities have on assignment games (Koopmans and
Beckmann 1957; Shapley and Shubik 1971). Assignment games provide a primitive
model of the jobmarket in which firms hire workers after negotiating salaries; we refer
to Roth and Sotomayor (1992) for a survey. Externalities are modelled by conditioning
the success of a firm and a worker on the matching of the other firms and workers.
So, how does this generalization affect the classical results on assignment games? Our
results suggest—dramatically. In particular, all of the findings of Shapley and Shubik
(1971) are overturned. In summary, (i) a problem may have no stable outcome, (ii)
efficient outcomes can be unstable, and (iii) the set of stable outcomes need not form
a lattice with respect to the agents’ payoffs.
We are motivated by the prevalence of externalities in everyday practical examples.
Consider a firm that produces phones. Its success stems of course mainly from the
competence of its employees, but it may also be influenced by firms that produce
complementary goods (like network capacity and signal) and its rivals that produce
similar phones. Thus, the value that a firm and a worker create at a matching—that
is, the amount of money that they divide into profit and salary—depends on how the
other agents are matched.
In our model, an outcome is a matching, a profit for each firm, and a salary for each
worker. We study outcomes that cannot be blocked, that is, stable outcomes. A firm f
and a worker w block an outcome if they are better off together than with their current
partners. Note, however, that blocking is not as straightforward as it may appear at first
glance. Upsetting the current matching affects not only the blocking pair f and w, but
also the values of the other pairs. As a consequence, other agents may swap partners
and thereby affect the value available to f and w.1 Hence, how agents forecast that
other agents react to their block is crucial to what is stable.
To decide on whether to block, f and w take all contingencies into account simul-
taneously. At each matching that can be formed upon a block by f and w, f and
w create some value. According to their attitude towards risk or beliefs about how
the other agents will match, these values induce a blocking threshold. The pair may
condition its threshold on the current matching, so it can, say, assign higher probability
on matchings more “similar” to the current. One interpretation of the threshold is that
it reflects the value that f and w expect to create if they block the current outcome. If
the threshold exceeds the sum of their current payoffs, then they block.
We can distinguish different types of agents based on how they determine their
threshold. A pair is pessimistic if the pair’s threshold is the smallest value that the
pair can create by matching. Thus, the pair is (maximally) pessimistic in its forecast
of the other agents’ reaction. Alternatively, the pair blocks only if it with certainty is
made better off. If pairs always are pessimistic, then there exist stable outcomes (due to
1 This is typically referred to as residual behaviour in the literature on cooperative game theory. See for
instance Aumann and Peleg (1960) and Shenoy (1980).
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Sasaki and Toda 1996). We complement this by showing necessity of pessimism. The-
orem 1 states that, if there is just one pair that at some matching is not pessimistic,
then there are values such that the corresponding assignment game with externalities
lacks stable outcomes.2 This finding is strong as it requires only the smallest conceiv-
able form of optimism but does so by exploiting that externalities may be arbitrarily
large. The “opposite” strategy can be applied to show that, if agents are sufficiently
optimistic, then there need not exist stable outcomes even if externalities are vanish-
ingly small (Example 2). Furthermore, even if externalities are “reasonably” bounded,
the negative result persists (Example 5). In contrast to games without externalities,
stability and efficiency no longer go hand in hand: we provide a stable but inefficient
matching and an efficient but unstable matching (Example 3). Another discrepancy
compared to games without externalities is that the set of stable outcomes need not
form a lattice with respect to the agents’ payoffs (Example 4).
Sasaki and Toda (1996) mainly study externalities in the marriage problem (Gale
and Shapley 1962),3 though they also briefly examine assignment games focusing
exclusively on pessimistic agents. Their approach to the marriage problem is to endow
each agent i with an “estimation function” ϕi that to each potential partner j associates
a set of matchings at which i and j are matched. Agents f and w form a blocking pair
whenever they prefer each matching μ ∈ ϕ f (w) ∪ ϕw( f ) to the current matching.
This approach is very reasonable as, in the ordinal marriage problem, the average of
two outcomes (that is, two matchings) bears no meaning. Therefore, blocking agents
cannot compare the current matching with, say, the expected post-block matching. In
contrast, the primitives of assignment games—the values—contain cardinal informa-
tion. Therefore, it is possible and meaningful for the agents to take all contingencies
into account simultaneously rather than separately, as agents do in our approach. Thus,
not only is our approach more flexible and general than using estimation functions,
but it is also better tailored to assignment games.
A series of recent papers are related to ours. Chen’s (2013)work is primarily focused
on applications, though he also finds a negative result that parallels our Theorem 1.
However, as his notion of stability uses estimation functions in the spirit of Sasaki
and Toda (1996), his result is subsumed by ours. Pycia and Yenmez (2016) examine
externalities in amatchingwith contracts-setting. They find that, if choice functions are
substitutable and satisfy “irrelevance of rejected alternatives”, then stable outcomes
(sets of contracts) exist. In contrast to our work, Pycia and Yenmez (2016) consider a
notion of stability in line with Gale and Shapley (1962) in the sense that agents assume
that their choices do not trigger reactions by the other agents. Instead, such predictions
can be built into the choice functions. Last, Eriksson et al. (2011) model assignment
games with social preferences. The value that a pair creates is independent of the
matching, but agents’ utilities depend negatively on the payoffs of the other agents
on the same side (for example, firms affect other firms). In our framework, payoffs
and utilities coincide. Eriksson et al. (2011) show that several results carry over from
2 Results of a similar nature have been found for cooperative games (Funaki and Yamato 1999; Kóczy
2007) and housing markets (Mumcu and Saglam 2007).
3 That is, two-sided matching without money. See also Li (1993), Dutta and Massó (1997), Echenique and
Yenmez (2007), and Hafalir (2008).
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Shapley and Shubik (1971) if agents are naïve. This is an assumption of bounded
rationality that, in essence, implies that agents expect almost everything to stay the
same after blocking. As just discussed in relation to Pycia and Yenmez (2016), this is
in contrast to our approach.
The outline of the paper is as follows: we introduce the model in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3,
we discuss the existence of stable outcomes, their relation with efficiency, and the
structure of the set of stable outcomes. In Sect. 4, we impose more structure on the
model but find that pessimism still is a necessity for the existence of stable outcomes.
2 Model
There are m firms F and n = m workers W .4 Amatching is a bijection μ : F → W .
The set of matchings is M. Let M f w = {μ ∈ M : μ( f ) = w} and M− f w =
M \ M f w. If μ( f ) = w, then we say that ( f, w) ∈ μ. For each ( f, w) ∈ F × W ,
α f w : M f w → R+ maps a value to each matching. Note that the value created by a
pair may differ across matchings. Let A ≡ (α f w) f ∈F,w∈W and letA be the collection
of such A’s.
A payoff vector for F is u ∈ Rm+, where u f is firm f ’s profit. Likewise, a payoff
vector for W is v ∈ Rn+, where vw is worker w’s salary. Payoff vectors (u, v) ∈
R
m+ × Rn+ are compatible with μ ∈ M in A ∈ A if, for each f ∈ F and w = μ( f ),
u f + vw = α f w(μ). An outcome of A ∈ A is (μ, u, v) ∈ M × Rm+ × Rn+ such that
(u, v) are compatible with μ in A. Given A ∈ A, μ ∈ M is efficient if, for each
μ′ ∈ M,
∑
( f,w)∈μ
α f w(μ) ≥
∑
( f,w)∈μ′
α f w(μ
′).
If, with some abuse of notation, for each ( f, w) ∈ F × W and {μ,μ′} ⊆ M,
α f w(μ) = α f w(μ′) ≡ α f w, then there are no externalities. The collection of (assign-
ment) gameswithout externalities isA0. A pair ( f, w) ∈ F ×W blocks the outcome
(μ, u, v) ∈ M × Rm+ × Rn+ of A ∈ A0 if u f + vw < α f w. An outcome (μ, u, v) is
stable in A ∈ A0 if no pair blocks it.
Proposition 1 (Shapley andShubik 1971)Let A ∈ A0 and (μ, u, v) ∈ M×Rm+×Rn+.
1. If (μ, u, v) is stable in A, then μ is efficient in A.
2. If (μ, u, v) is stable in A and μ′ ∈ M is efficient, then (μ′, u, v) is stable in A.
3. The set of stable outcomes of A forms a non-empty complete lattice with respect
to the firms’ profits and the workers’ salaries.
We ask if these results also hold on the larger domainA, that is, when externalities
are present. However, before we can even start to answer these questions, we have to
define stable outcomes in these more general problems. Example 1 shows that this is
not straightforward.
4 That n = m is without loss as we otherwise can balance the count with agents that create no value in any
pair.
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Table 1 Values for Example 1
Matching Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3
μ1 = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w2), ( f3, w3)} 2 2 1
μ2 = {( f1, w2), ( f2, w3), ( f3, w1)} 2 0 2
μ3 = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w3), ( f3, w2)} 2 2 1
For instance, the “0” indicates that f2 and w3 are matched at μ2 and generate a value of α f2w3 (μ2) = 0
Example 1 (What outcomes are stable?) Let F = { f1, f2, f3} and W =
{w1, w2, w3}. Table 1 displays the values created by the different pairs; all other
values are zero. Is the outcome (μ1, u, v) with u = (1, 1, 1) and v = (1, 1, 0) stable?
Except for f2 and w3, no pair has anything to gain from deviating from (μ1, u, v).
The stability of (μ1, u, v), therefore, boils down to whether f2 and w3 object to it. We
have u f2 + vw3 = 1 + 0 and
α f2w3(μ2) = 0 < 1 < 2 = α f2w3(μ3).
Therefore, it makes sense for f2 and w3 to break up their current partnerships and
match with one another if the matching formed thereupon is μ3, but not if it is μ2.
However, this is out of their control. Hence, whether f2 and w3 block the outcome
depends onwhether they aremore optimistic (expectμ3 to be formed) than pessimistic
(expect μ2). ◦
We wish to formalize the insights of Example 1. Agents have expectations on
what will occur as a consequence of them blocking a matching. A pair of agents
block an outcome if their “blocking threshold” exceeds their joint payoffs. For each
( f, w) ∈ F × W , define the optimistic value ω f w ∈ R as the largest value that the
pair can achieve. Conversely, define the pessimistic value π f w ∈ R as the smallest
value that the pair can achieve (that is, the value that the pair can guarantee itself). In
Example 1, ω f2w3 = α f2w3(μ3) = 2 and π f2w3 = α f2w3(μ2) = 0. Formally,
ω f w = max
μ∈M f w
α f w(μ)
π f w = min
μ∈M f w
α f w(μ).
Certainly, f and w have strong reasons to object to an outcome for which u f +
vw < π f w—if they break up their current partnerships to instead form one together,
they are better off no matter how the other agents react. For each ( f, w) ∈ F × W ,
λ f w : M− f w → [0, 1] is used to determine the blocking threshold b f w(μ) ∈ R:5
b f w(μ) = λ f w(μ) · ω f w + (1 − λ f w(μ)) · π f w.
5 We may assume that f and w have different thresholds. However, as f and w block only if they agree
on doing so, it is only the smaller of the individual blocking thresholds that is relevant.
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A pair ( f, w) ∈ F × W is pessimistic at μ ∈ M− f w if λ f w(μ) = 0. A game
with externalities is (A, λ), where A ∈ A and λ ≡ (λ f w(μ)) f ∈F,w∈W,μ∈M− f w .
The collection of games with externalities is E . A pair ( f, w) ∈ F × W blocks the
outcome (μ, u, v) ∈ M×Rm+ ×Rn+ of (A, λ) ∈ E if u f +vw < b f w(μ). An outcome
(μ, u, v) is stable in (A, λ) if no pair blocks it.
3 Results
We first observe that the set of stable outcomes for a game with externalities is related
to that of a particular game without externalities.
Observation 1 An outcome (μ, u, v) ∈ M×Rm+ ×Rn+ is stable in (A, λ) ∈ E if and
only if (μ, u, v) is stable in Bμ ∈ A0, where Bμ = (βμf w) f ∈F,w∈W and
β
μ
f w =
{
α f w(μ) if ( f, w) ∈ μ
b f w(μ) if ( f, w) /∈ μ.
Proof Let (μ, u, v) be stable in (A, λ). We proceed in two steps. First, we show that
(μ, u, v) is an outcome of Bμ. Then we show that (μ, u, v) is stable in Bμ.
As (μ, u, v) is an outcome of (A, λ), for each f ∈ F and w = μ( f ), u f + vw =
α f w(μ). By construction, α f w(μ) = βμf w. Therefore, u f + vw = βμf w, so (μ, u, v)
is an outcome of Bμ.
As (μ, u, v) is stable in (A, λ), for each ( f, w) ∈ F × W such that w 
= μ( f ),
u f + vw ≥ b f w(μ). By construction, b f w(μ) = βμf w. Then u f + vw ≥ βμf w, so
(μ, u, v) is stable in Bμ.
For the other direction, suppose that (μ, u, v) is not stable in (A, λ). Then there is
( f, w) ∈ F × W such that w 
= μ( f ) and u f + vw < b f w(μ) = βμf w. But then f
and w block (μ, u, v) in Bμ. 
This result does not imply that there always are stable outcomes in games with
externalities. Surely, Bμ has stable outcomes as it has no externalities (Proposition 1).
However, if these outcomes use matchings other than μ, then none of them needs to
be stable in (A, λ).
3.1 Existence
Next, we state a sufficient condition for existence of stable outcomes.Namely, there are
stable outcomes if agents are pessimistic and hence conservative in forming blocking
pairs.
Proposition 2 (Sasaki and Toda 1996, Theorem 6.1) Fix λ such that pairs always are
pessimistic: for each ( f, w) ∈ F × W and μ ∈ M− f w, λ f w(μ) = 0. Then, for each
A ∈ A, there is a stable outcome in (A, λ).
Our main result shows that even the “slightest” optimism can deter the existence of
stable outcomes. This result is strong: it requires just one pair to be non-pessimistic at
just one matching.
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Theorem 1 Fix λ such that pairs are not always pessimistic: there is ( f, w) ∈ F ×W,
μ ∈ M− f w, and ε > 0 such that λ f w(μ) = ε. Then there is A ∈ A such that (A, λ)
has no stable outcome.
Proof Let F = { f1, f2, . . . , fn} and W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn}. Assume ( f1, w1) ∈
F × W is not pessimistic at μ̂ ∈ M− f1w1 , say λ f1w1(μ̂) = ε. Without loss, define μ̂
and μ̃ ∈ M as follows:
μ̂ = {( f1, w2), ( f2, w3), . . . , ( fn−1, wn), ( fn, w1)}
μ̃ = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w2), . . . , ( fn, wn)}
Define A ∈ A such that, for each fi ∈ F and μ ∈ M fi wi+1 , α fi wi+1(μ) = 1 (mod n).
Moreover, α f1w1(μ̃) = 2/ε + 1, and let all other values be 0. Then
b f1w1(μ̂) = [λ f1w1(μ̂)] · ω f1w1 + [(1 − λ f1w1(μ̂))] · π f1w1
= ε · (2/ε + 1) + (1 − ε) · 0 = 2 + ε.
Additionally, for each fi ∈ F and μ ∈ M− fi wi+1 , ω fi wi+1 = π fi wi+1 = 1, so
b fi wi+1(μ) = 1.
Let (u, v) ∈ Rm+ × Rn+. Consider (μ̂, u, v). As μ̂( f1) = w2, u f1 + vw2 =
α f1w2(μ̂) = 1. As μ̂( fn) = w1, u fn + vw1 = α fnw1(μ̂) = 1. As u fn ≥ 0 and
vwn ≥ 0, u f1 + vw1 ≤ 2 < b f1w1(μ̂). Hence, f1 and w1 block (μ̂, u, v).
Consider (μ, u, v) for μ 
= μ̂. Then there is fi ∈ F such that μ( fi ) 
= wi+1.
Without loss, let μ( fi ) = w j and μ( fk) = wi+1 As μ( fi ) = w j , u fi + vw j =
α fi w j (μ) = 0. As μ( fk) = wi+1, u fk + vwi+1 = α fkwi+1(μ) = 0. Then u fi = u fk =
vw j = vwi+1 = 0, and therefore, u fi + vwi+1 = 0 < b fi wi+1(μ). Hence, fi and wi+1
block (μ, u, v).
As this exhausts all possibilities, there is no stable outcome. 
For Theorem 1, we exploit that externalities may be arbitrarily large. In Example 2,
we show that, if agents are sufficiently optimistic, then there need not exist stable
outcomes even if externalities are vanishingly small.
Example 2 (Minimal externalities, no stable outcome) Consider a game with exter-
nalities where pairs are “sufficiently” optimistic. For each ( f, w) ∈ F × W and
μ ∈ M− f w, λ f w(μ) > (n − 1)/n. Values are symmetric and externalities are van-
ishingly small: for some ε > 0 and each ( f, w) ∈ F × W ,
{α f w(μ) : μ ∈ M f w} = {1, 1 + ε}.
Then, for each ( f, w) ∈ F × W and μ ∈ M− f w, ω f w = 1 + ε. Assume, for each
μ ∈ M, that there is ( f, w) ∈ μ such that α f w(μ) = 1. Then there is no stable
outcome.6 The externalities vanish both in relative and absolute terms:
6 The smallest value needed to satisfy all pairs exceeds n
([(n −1)/n] · (1+ε)+[1/n] ·1), which simplifies
to n(1 + ε) − ε. But this is also an upper bound on the total value available.
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ω f w
π f w
= 1 + ε
1
→ 1 as ε → 0 ω f w − π f w = (1 + ε) − 1 → 0 as ε → 0.
Hence, even the smallest of externalities can be problematic if agents are optimistic.◦
3.2 Efficiency
In contrast to games without externalities, efficiency and stability now no longer go
hand in hand. Sasaki and Toda (1996, Example 6.1) show that inefficient matchings
may be stable. To complement this finding, Example 3 shows that efficient matchings
may be unstable.
Example 3 (Unstable efficient matching) Let F = { f1, f2, f3}, W = {w1, w2, w3},
and values α f w(μ) = 0 except the following:
α f1w1(μ1) = 2 for μ1 = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w2), ( f3, w3)}
α f2w3(μ2) = 1 for μ2 = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w3), ( f3, w2)}
α f2w3(μ3) = 1 for μ3 = {( f1, w2), ( f2, w3), ( f3, w1)}.
Then μ1 is efficient though agents f2 and w3 block each outcome (μ1, u, v). The
inefficient outcome (μ2, u, v) is stable for u = (0, 1, 0) and v = (0, 0, 0). ◦
3.3 The structure of the set of stable outcomes
Without externalities the set of stable outcomes forms a complete lattice with respect
to the agents’ payoffs. It has two extreme points: one which all firms prefer to all
other stable outcomes, one which all workers prefer to all other stable outcomes. By
the intuition of Observation 1, we retrieve an immediate corollary of this result if we
restrict attention to specific matchings: for each (A, λ) ∈ E and μ ∈ M,
{
(u, v) ∈ Rm+ × Rn+ : (μ, u, v) is stable in (A, λ)
}
forms a complete lattice. Thus, if (A, λ) has a unique stable matching, then the game’s
set of stable outcomes forms a lattice. However, Example 4 shows that, if there are
multiple stable matchings, then the set of stable outcomes may lose this structure.
Example 4 (Set of stable outcomes, no lattice structure) Let F = { f1, f2, f3} and
W = {w1, w2, w3}. All pairs are pessimistic; values are in Table 2.
There are two stable matchings: μ1 and μ4. The set of stable payoffs compatible
with μ1 forms a lattice with (firm-) minimal element u = (1, 0, 0) and v = (7, 6, 4).
This set is disjoint from the set of stable outcomes compatible with μ4. This latter set
has minimal element u′ = (0, 0, 1)with v′ = (5, 4, 8). For neither matching, the meet
u ∧ u′ = (0, 0, 0) is stable. See Fig. 1 for an illustration.
As agents get more optimistic, they object to more outcomes, so the set of stable
outcomes shrinks. For concreteness, suppose for each ( f, w) ∈ F × W and μ ∈
M− f w, λ f w(μ) = 0.4. Then only μ4 is stable. ◦
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Table 2 Values for Example 4
Matching Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3
μ1 = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w2), ( f3, w3)} 8 6 4
μ2 = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w3), ( f3, w2)} 3 4 5
μ3 = {( f1, w2), ( f2, w1), ( f3, w3)} 6 4 4
μ4 = {( f1, w2), ( f2, w3), ( f3, w1)} 4 8 6
μ5 = {( f1, w3), ( f2, w1), ( f3, w2)} 5 2 5
μ6 = {( f1, w3), ( f2, w2), ( f3, w1)} 5 2 5
Fig. 1 (Set of stable payoffs for Example 4.) The dark grey area shows the lattice structure of the stable
payoffs compatible with μ1 when agents are pessimistic. The light grey area is the set of stable payoffs
compatible with μ4. The black area is the set of stable payoffs when agents are less pessimistic, namely,
for each ( f, w) ∈ F × W and μ ∈ M− f w , λ f w(μ) = 0.4. Importantly, the two grey areas are disjoint
Without externalities, we can “swap” stable matchings: if the outcomes (μ, u, v)
and (μ′, u′, v′) are stable in A ∈ A0, then so is (μ′, u, v). It follows immediately from
Example 4 that this does not extend to games with externalities.
4 Imposing more structure
In the proof of Theorem 1 and in Example 2, we exploit either (i) large externalities
when agents are optimistic or (ii) (almost) optimistic agents when externalities are
small. In this section, we impose more structure on the values and the externalities and
ask whether this overturns the negative findings. The setting is highly restrictive on
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Table 3 Values for Example 5
Matching Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3
μ1 = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w2), ( f3, w3)} 1 8 7
μ2 = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w3), ( f3, w2)} 3 9 6
μ3 = {( f1, w2), ( f2, w1), ( f3, w3)} 2 7 5
μ4 = {( f1, w2), ( f2, w3), ( f3, w1)} 6 9 3
μ5 = {( f1, w3), ( f2, w1), ( f3, w2)} 5 7 2
μ6 = {( f1, w3), ( f2, w2), ( f3, w1)} 7 8 1
purpose: we aim to show that the negative results persist even if values are constructed
“realistically”.
The skill of worker w is s(w) ∈ R: no matter where w is employed, she adds
value s(w). Firms produce different products, some complement each other, some
substitute. The “degree of complementarity” is captured by κ : F × F → R. If firms f
and f ′ produce complementary goods, then κ( f, f ′) > 0. If they produce substitutes,
κ( f, f ′) < 0. For each f ∈ F , κ( f, f ) = 1. The value created by ( f, w) ∈ F × W
at μ ∈ M f w is
α f w(μ) =
∑
f ′∈F
κ( f, f ′) · s(μ( f ′)).
Example 5 (Negative results not overturned by more structure) Let F = { f1, f2, f3}
and W = {w1, w2, w3}. For simplicity, the skill of wi ∈ W is s(wi ) = 2i . That is,
w1 is the least productive worker, w3 the most. Firms f1 and f3 produce substitutable
goods (different brands of phones), say κ( f1, f3) = −0.5. Firm f2 produces a com-
plementary good (phone accessories), say κ( f1, f2) = κ( f2, f3) = 0.5.7 Therefore,
at μ1 = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w2), ( f3, w3)}, ( f1, w1) creates a value of 1:
α f1w1(μ1) = κ( f1, f1) · s
(
μ1( f1)
) + κ( f1, f2) · s
(
μ1( f2)
) + κ( f1, f3) · s
(
μ1( f3)
)
= 1 · s(w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
+ 1/2 · s(w2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
+ (−1/2) · s(w3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−3
= 1.
All values are displayed in Table 3.
If pairs always are pessimistic, then each matching is stable. However, when no
pair is pessimistic, that is, when there is ε > 0 such that, for each ( f, w) ∈ F × W
and μ ∈ M− f w, λ f w(μ) ≥ ε, then there is no stable outcome. We only give proof to
this claim for μ1. The exercise can be repeated for the other matchings.
7 Number are chosen to simplify the example; more “varied” example are available upon request.
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Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that (μ1, u, v) is stable. For f1 and w2 not to
block,
u f1 + vw2 = u f1 + (8 − u f2) ≥ b f1w2(μ1) ≥ ε · ω f1w2 + (1 − ε) · π f1w2 > π f1w2 = 2.
Then u f2 − u f1 < 6. For f2 and w1 not to block,
u f2 + vw1 = u f2 + (1 − u f1) ≥ b f2w1(μ1) = 7 ⇔ u f2 − u f1 ≥ 6.
Thus, no matter the outcome (μ1, u, v), either f1 and w2 or f2 and w1 block. ◦
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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